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THE ANTIQUATED "SLIGHT EVIDENCE RULE" IN
FEDERAL CONSPIRACY CASES
Brent E. Newton*
I. THE SWEEPING DRAGNET OF FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW
Few, if any, areas of criminal law raise the specter of
convicting the innocent-or the marginally culpable-more than
federal conspiracy law. ' The essence of a criminal conspiracy is
a simple agreement between two or more persons to commit an
offense! Because by their very nature conspiracies are secretive,
* J.D., Columbia University School of Law; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. The author is an Assistant Federal Public Defender in Houston, Texas.
1. The generic federal conspiracy statute is found in 18 U.S.C. § 371. The statute
provides in pertinent part: "If two or more persons conspire ... to commit any offense
against the United States ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years or both." Id. Other specific conspiracy offenses are found in the federal criminal
code. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 846 (drug conspiracy statute).
2. E.g., United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947). "It is well settled that the
essential elements of the crime of conspiracy are: (1) that the defendant agreed with at least
one other person to commit an offense; (2) the defendant knowingly participated in the
conspiracy with the specific intent to commit the offenses that were the objects of the
conspiracy; and (3) during the existence of the conspiracy, at least one of the overt acts set
forth in the indictment was committed by one or more of the members of the conspiracy in
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they are rarely proved with direct evidence and, instead,
typically must be proved with circumstantial evidence. For that
reason, courts have been quite liberal in permitting conspiracy
convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence.'
The danger to a defendant charged with conspiracy is not
only that he or she will be held criminally liable for the offense
of conspiracy itself, but also that he or she will be vicariously
liable for any substantive offense conmmitted by another
conspirator "in furtherance of' the conspiracy.4  This
"powerfully broad"5 doctrine of vicarious liability-known as
the Pinkerton doctrine6--extends to offenses in which a
defendant did not participate or of which the defendant did not
have any actual knowledge.7 For this reason, many leading
jurists have criticized the sweeping "dragnet" created by
Pinkerton.! Nevertheless, it remains the law and has been a
common tool used by prosecutors for many decades to secure
convictions.
furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy." United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88,
145 (2d Cir. 1998).
3. E.g., United States v. Podlog, 35 F.3d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1994).
4. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946). Although the statutory
maximum punishment for a conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371 is five years in
prison, a defendant convicted of a substantive offense under Pinkerton's vicarious liability
doctrine is subject to the imprisonment range set forth in the substantive statute. See, e.g.,
United States v. Willis, 102 F.3d 1078, 1083-85 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
2517 (1997) (under Pinkerton, upholding life sentence for armed bank robbery conviction
where evidence only showed that the defendant had conspired with others to commit bank
larceny and that the defendant had no role in using firearm in escape from bank).
5. United States v. Rodriguez, 831 F.2d 162, 168 (7th Cir. 1987).
6. E.g., United States v. Thompson, 122 F.3d 304, 307 (5th Cir. 1997).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 759-60 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Minor
members of a conspiracy run the risk of prosecution for every crime committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy, even crimes in which they did not directly participate.");
United States v. Schultz, 855 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1988) ("It is not necessary to prove
that the defendant was aware of each act of his co-conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy [in order to be held liable under Pinkerton].").
8. E.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-58 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring, joined by Frankfurter & Murphy, JJ.).
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II. THE LOWER COURTS' PERSISTENT APPLICATION OF
THE ANTIQUATED "SLIGHT EVIDENCE RULE"
With respect to the quantum of proof necessary to link a
defendant to a criminal conspiracy, virtually every United States
Court of Appeals, at one time or the other during the past several
decades, has applied the "slight evidence rule." That rule
provides that, where there is evidence establishing the existence
of a conspiracy between at least two other people, the
prosecution need only offer "slight evidence" of a defendant's
"knowing participation" or "intentional involvement" in the
existing conspiracy-that is, the defendant's mens rea-to
secure the defendant's conviction.' The "slight evidence rule"
was created out of thin air by the Fifth Circuit in 1930 in
Tomplain v. United States.' Other circuits adopted it in the
following decades.'1 "The question of how this doctrine crept
into the law is truly a remarkable one... " 12 According to
Second Circuit Judge John 0. Newman, the slight evidence rule
"gained acceptance because of a confusion between the correct
rule that only a slight connection between a defendant and a
9. E.g., United States v. Hester, 140 F.3d 753, 761 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Brown, 912 F.2d 1040, 1044
(9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Celcer, 500 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1974); see generally
John 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 994-95 & nn. 66-
69 (1993) (discussing the slight evidence rule).
In some states that have modeled their conspiracy law on the federal doctrine,
courts have likewise only required "slight evidence" of a defendant's knowing
participation in a conspiracy. E.g., People v. Danielson, 21 Cal. Rptr. 469, 473 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); State v. Jenner, 434 N.W.2d 76, 81 (S.D. 1988).
10. 42 F.2d 202, 203 (5th Cir. 1930). The "slight evidence rule" discussed in this
article should not be confused with a superficially similar, yet distinct, rule applied by
many courts which provides that only "slight evidence" of a defendant's participation in a
conspiracy need be offered in order to admit a co-conspirator's out-of-court statement
under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). E.g., United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006,
1016 (9th Cir. 1987). The rule discussed in this article concerns the quantum of evidence
necessary to support a conviction, while the other "slight evidence rule" concerns the
quantum of evidence necessary to admit an out-of-court statement under the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule.
11. E.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 168 F.2d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 1948), aff'd on
other grounds, 336 U.S. 613 (1949).
12. United States v. Austin, 768 F.2d 302, 303 (10th Cir. 1985) (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
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conspiracy need be shown and the incorrect rule that only slight
evidence is needed to prove that connection." 13
The slight evidence rule was applied only sporadically from
1930 until 1970, when the use of the rule in the lower federal
courts "increased dramatically." " However, by the mid- to late-
1970s, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits-the leading proponents of
the rule up until that point-stemmed the tide by "banish[ing]"
the slight evidence rule in favor of the requirement that the
prosecution must offer "substantial evidence" that proves
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that a defendant knowingly
participated in a conspiracy with others.'5 Such a proof
requirement was consistent with the Supreme Court's repeated
holding in the 1970s that the Due Process Clause requires proof
of every element of an offense "beyond a reasonable doubt" to
uphold a conviction."
The First, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
followed suit in the next two decades by rejecting the traditional
slight evidence rule. 7 Rather than outright abolishing the rule,
some courts have purported to reformulate the slight evidence
rule by requiring "substantial evidence" of a defendant's
knowing participation in the conspiracy but upholding
convictions based on evidence of a defendant's "slight"
13. Newman, supra note 9, at 994. It is well settled that a defendant is equally guilty of
conspiracy even if his or her relative role in the conspiracy, or "connection" thereto, is
extremely minor. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 922 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 753 (1998). This is because, as noted above, the gist of the offense of
conspiracy is an agreement by two or more persons to commit one or more offenses.
Because the conspirators' agreement itself is what the law aims at punishing, it is
immaterial what role a particular defendant played in the joint criminal endeavor. Even a
defendant with a minor connection to the conspiracy is guilty, so long as he or she
knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy.
14. United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1382 n.l (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
15. Id. at 1381-82; United States v. Dunn, 564 F.2d 348, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1977).
16. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970).
17. United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1427 (1lth Cir. 1998); United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 861-62 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1087 (1997); United
States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1225-29 (7th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Marsh,
747 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1984) (explaining reference to slight evidence rule in United States
v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 866 (Ist Cir. 1984)); United States v. Samuels, 741 F.2d 570, 573
(3d Cir. 1984) (overruling, in a sub silentio manner, a prior line of Third Circuit cases
applying the slight evidence rule, e.g., United States v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1027
(3d Cir. 1978)).
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involvement in the conspiracy.' 8 However, such a reformulation
effectively abolished the traditional slight evidence rule insofar
as the reformulated rule requires substantial proof of a
defendant's mens rea, even if the defendant's relative role in the
conspiracy-his actus reus-was extremely minor. Because the
gravamen of a criminal conspiracy is a "meeting of the minds"
to break the law, 9 a defendant's degree of participation in
furtherance of the conspiracy is not particularly important.2"
The Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have never
abolished or reformulated, and regularly continue to apply, the
traditional slight evidence rule in conspiracy cases." Curiously,
these circuits have never even addressed the frequently-voiced
criticisms of the rule.22 The Eighth Circuit has taken the lead in
applying the slight evidence rule in dozens of conspiracy cases
decided in the last few years."
Perhaps more troubling than these four circuits' failure to
abolish the antiquated slight evidence rule is the inexplicable
reappearance of the traditional rule by other circuits that had
previously claimed to have abolished the rule. During the last
decade, panels of the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
seemingly ignored their circuits' prior decisions abolishing the
18. Toler, 144 F.3d at 1427-28.
19. United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1546 (10th Cir. 1996).
20. It is well settled that, so long as any single member of a conspiracy undertakes even
one "overt act" in support of the conspirators' agreement, the conviction of ali members of
the conspiracy will be upheld even if none of the other co-conspirators engaged in any acts
in furtherance of the conspiracy. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942). In
federal drug conspiracy cases, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, the prosecution need not present any
proof of an overt act. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994).
21. E.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 145 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Alaniz, 148 F.3d 929, 933 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 781
(6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 583 (10th Cir. 1984). No reported
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit has ever mentioned the slight evidence rule.
22. One judge each on the Second and Tenth Circuits has leveled criticism at the slight
evidence rule: Second Circuit Judge John Newman, supra note 9, at 994; and Tenth Circuit
Judge Monroe McKay, United States v. Austin, 768 F.2d 302, 303 (10th Cir. 1985)
(McKay, J., dissenting). However, no majority opinion in either circuit has ever discussed
the obvious problems with the slight evidence rule.
23. A Westlaw search ("slight evidence" /10 conspir!) reveals nearly 100 such cases
decided by the Eighth Circuit during the last two decades-the majority in the last few
years.
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slight evidence rule and have continued to apply the traditional
rule in conspiracy cases."
The First Circuit's treatment of the rule demonstrates how
difficult it may be for an appellate court to adopt a new position
or doctrine and to ensure its application in practice. For
example, in United States v. Marsh, the court addressed the
concept of "slight evidence" at length, rejecting the notion that
a lesser standard of proof should be applied in evaluating
sufficiency of evidence claims in conspiracy cases. 25 The court
concluded:
In other words, if the government proves beyond a
reasonable doubt at least a slight, though willing and
knowing, connection between a defendant and a
conspiracy, an appellate court will affirm the defendant's
conviction for participation in that conspiracy. It perhaps
should be called the "slight connection" rule instead of the
"slight evidence" rule. This, indeed, is the sense in which
we have used the rule in what we think is the only occasion
we have had to invoke it. United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d
852, 866 (1st Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding that the
government had adequately demonstrated the connection of
26various defendants to a heroin distribution scheme).
However, in United States v. Cassiere,27 discussing sufficiency
of the evidence of conspiracy, the court cited Smith and
observed, "Moreover, once the evidence establishes the
existence of a conspiracy, lesser evidence may suffice to show a
defendant's connection with the overall conspiracy." Cassiere
casts doubt on the message sent by the Marsh court in expressly
24. E.g., United States v. Paul, 142 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Mulderig, 120 F.3d 534, 547 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1510 (1998); United
States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1075, reh. en banc granted on other grounds, 123 F.3d
213 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Krenning, 93 F.3d 1257, 1265 (5th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d
1006 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Martin, 4 F.3d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting
United States v. Brown, 912 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1990)); United States v. Ramirez,
983 F.2d 1079 (table), 1993 WL 6601, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1993); United States v. Diaz-
Garcia, 931 F.2d 61 (table), 1991 WL 66276, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 1991); United States
v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1977).
25. United States v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 7, 11-13 (1st Cir. 1984).
26. Id. at 13.
27. 4 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1993).
28. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).
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rejecting the argument that a lesser standard of proof-slight
evidence-applies to the review of sufficiency issues in
conspiracy cases.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit claimed to have abolished
the slight evidence rule in 1992 in United States v. Clavis,29 but
numerous subsequent decisions ignored Clavis and resurrected
the traditional slight evidence rule.3° Very recently, however,
another panel of the Eleventh Circuit once again has abolished
the slight evidence rule, citing Clavis and the Fifth Circuit's
1979 en banc decision in Malatesta.
3" 0
The Fifth Circuit's resurrection of the slight evidence rule
has been the most remarkable, considering that a unanimous en
banc court expressly "banished" the rule in 1979 in Malatesta.
The first such post-Malatesta case was United States v.
Massey,32 in which the court held that "once the existence of a
conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it are both
established, slight evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the
scheme may be sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that he or
she was a member."33 Not since 1987 has a Fifth Circuit panel
even cited the court's en banc decision in Malatesta for the
proposition that "substantial evidence" is necessary to prove
that a defendant was a knowing participant in a conspiracy.
3 4
Those circuits which have abolished the slight evidence
rule have done so based on the modem of axiom of criminal law
that requires that each element of an offense to be proven
29. 977 F.2d 538, 539 (11 th Cir. 1992).
30. E.g., United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1326 (11th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 452 (11 th Cir. 1994).
31. United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1427 (11 th Cir. 1998).
32. 827 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir. 1987).
33. Id. at 1003 (quoting United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 756 (5th Cir. 1978)).
The panel in Massey cited the panel decision in Malatesta, reported at 583 F.2d 748, as
"settled law" and failed to note that the panel decision was later vacated and reversed by
the en banc court. A subsequent Fifth Circuit panel similarly relied on two pre-Malatesta
panel decisions applying the slight evidence rule. United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981,
991 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Duncan, in turn, has been cited as settled authority
by numerous Fifth Circuit panels. E.g., Mulderig, 120 F.3d at 547.
34. United States v. Davis, 810 F.2d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 1987). Remarkably, in United
States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176 (5th Cir. 1997), a Fifth Circuit panel cited the court's
en banc decision in Malatesta for a separate proposition of law regarding sufficiency
review in conspiracy cases but then cited an inconsistent post-Malatesta panel decision in
support of its application of the slight evidence rule. Id. at 1189-90.
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"beyond a reasonable doubt,"35 as well as on the Supreme
Court's repeated statement that, at least in federal criminal
cases, each element of an offense must be proven by
"substantial evidence."36 The most cogent criticisms of the
slight evidence rule are found in Fifth Circuit Judge Coleman's
concurring opinion in United States v. Malatesta3 and Seventh
Circuit Judge Easterbrook's concurring opinion in United States
v. Martinez de Ortiz3 -- whose respective positions were
eventually adopted b y the en banc Fifth and Seventh Circuits.39
Judge Easterbrook, warning of the sweeping dragnet of federal
conspiracy law, correctly concluded that the slight evidence rule
cannot "be reconciled with the reasonable-doubt standard":
"Conspiracy" is a net in which prosecutors catch many
little fish. We should not go out of our way to tighten the
mesh. Prosecutors have many legitimate advantages in the
criminal process. Defendants' great counterweight is the
requirement that the prosecution establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. [The slight evidence rule] reduce[s] the
power of that requirement.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S HEIGHTENED REQUIREMENT OF
PROOF OF A DEFENDANT'S MENS REA IN CONSPIRACY CASES
The Supreme Court has never addressed the slight evidence
rule. However, the Court's own cases addressing the federal
conspiracy doctrine are flatly inconsistent with the traditional
slight evidence rule. To mitigate the draconian effect of federal
conspiracy law, the Supreme Court for many decades has
required a heightened standard of proof of a defendant's mens
rea in conspiracy cases:
35. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
36. E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
37. 583 F.2d 748, 760-64 (5th Cir. 1978) (Coleman, J., concurring) (panel decision).
38. 883 F.2d 515, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1989), reh 'g granted and opinion vacated, 897 F.2d
220 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
39. United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1380 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc); United
States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1221 n.* (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that all of the judges of
the en banc Seventh Circuit had approved of abolition of the slight evidence rule).
40. United States v. Martinez de Ortiz, 883 F.2d 515, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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Without the knowledge [of an illegal scheme created by
other persons], [a defendant's] intent [to accomplish a
conspiracy's criminal objectives] cannot exist....
Furthermore, to establish the intent, the evidence of
knowledge must be clear, not equivocal. This, because
charges of conspiracy are not to be made out by piling
inference upon inference, thus fashioning ... a dragnet to
draw in all substantive crimes .
The Court has also charged federal courts of appeals with
the responsibility of "scrutiniz[ing] the record for evidence [of a
defendant's criminal mens rea] with special care in a conspiracy
case." An irreconcilable conflict exists between the slight
evidence rule and the Supreme Court's commands in Direct
Sales Company, Ingram, and Anderson.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that "[t]he primary
responsibility for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
[belongs to] the Court[s] of Appeals," not the high Court 3
Thus, a criminal defendant has little, if any, chance of having the
Supreme Court grant certiorari and engage in a case-specific
review of the evidence supporting his or her conviction, even if
the lower courts fundamentally erred in finding constitutionally
sufficient evidence.
The Supreme Court's delegation of appellate sufficiency
review to the federal courts of appeals in criminil cases raises
great concern in the context of conspiracy cases and the slight
evidence rule. Considering the large number of modem cases in
which the courts of appeals have invoked the traditional slight
evidence rule, it is fair to assume that myriad defendants-no
doubt, some of them innocent-have been wrongly deprived of
their liberty by appellate courts applying'the antiquated rule.
41. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). See also Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 680 (1959) (emphasis
added) (quoting Direct Sales); accord Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 224 (1974)
(citing Direct Sales and Ingram).
42. Anderson, 417 U.S. at 224. The Supreme Court has long recognized "the
importance of appellate review to a correct adjudication of [a criminal defendant's] guilt or
innocence" in criminal cases generally. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). In
particular, "[t]he question whether a defendant has been convicted upon inadequate
evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or innocence." Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 323 (1979). Sufficiency review by an appellate court is one of the most important
"safeguards against jury irrationality." United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984).
43. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974).
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Similarly, countless district courts, in ruling on defendants'
motions for judgments of acquittal under rule 29 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, undoubtedly have wrongly applied
the slight evidence rule in denying such motions.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has an obligation to grant
certiorari in an appropriate case and, for once and for all, abolish
the slight evidence rule. The wide division among virtually all of
the United States Courts of Appeals as well as the numerous
intra-circuit conflicts present ample justification for a grant of
certiorari on this issue.a A defendant should not be convicted of
conspiracy-or, under the Pinkerton doctrine, convicted of any
substantive offense committed by another member of the
conspiracy-unless the prosecution has offered substantial
evidence, that is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, of the
defendant's knowing and intentional participation in the
conspiracy.
44. SUP. CT. R. 10(a) provides that a division among the United States Courts of
Appeals on a particular issue is a traditional basis for a grant of certiorari.
